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Freeswick: United States v. Hale

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

CRIMINAL

UNITED STATES v. HALE
LAW-Evidence-The prosecution may not cross-

examine the defendant about his silence during police interrogation, since under the circumstances of this case, the probative
value of the defendant's silence on the issue of his credibility was
outweighed by the danger of its prejudicial impact on the jury.
95 S. Ct. 2133 (1975).
May the prosecution cross-examine a defendant about his
silence while he was under arrest and under police interrogation
for the purpose of impeaching his credibility without running
afoul of the defendant's fifth amendment right to remain silent?
In Miranda v. Arizona' the Supreme Court appeared to hold that
the fact that a defendant stood mute or claimed his fifth amendment privilege in the face of police accusation could not be used
2
against him at trial for any purpose. In United States v. Hale,
the Supreme Court avoided this constitutional issue by holding
that as a matter of federal evidentiary law, the fact of the defendant's silence was inadmissible for impeachment purposes since
its probative value on the issue of credibility was outweighed by
the danger of its prejudicial impact on the jury.
United States v. Hale and Silence As A PriorInconsistent
Statement
In Hale the facts were these: 3 Lonnie Arrington, the complaining witness, testified that while on the way to a shoe store
he stopped to talk to the defendant, William Hale, whom he knew
by sight but not by name. Hale followed Arrington into the shoe
store. Upon leaving, Arrington was assaulted and robbed by five
men. He immediately reported the incident to the police, claiming that $65 had been stolen. Later, after consulting with his wife,
he reported that the sum had actually been $96. While waiting
to assist the police in their search, Arrington noticed the defendant and another man. Upon being approached by the police,
both Hale and his companion fled. Hale was apprehended, identified by Arrington as one of the robbers, and placed under arrest.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 95 S. Ct. 2133 (1975).
3. United States v. Hale, 498 F.2d 1038, 1039-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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He was then taken to police headquarters where he was advised
that he had a right to remain silent and that anything he said
could be used against him. A search revealed that he was in
possession of $158-$123 in his pocket and $35 in his wallet. A
police officer then asked Hale, "Where did you get the money?"
Hale stood mute.
At trial Hale took the stand in his own defense and testified
that he had indeed met Arrington on the day in question. He
claimed, however, that after leaving Arrington, he was approached by three men who asked whether Arrington had any
money. Hale testified that he had replied that he "didn't know."
According to his testimony, he then went to a narcotics treatment
center where he remained until after the time of the robbery. (An
administrator at the narcotics treatment center testified that his
records indicated that Hale had been at the center on the day in
question, but that they did not indicate the time.) Hale further
testified that he left the narcotics center with a friend who subsequently purchased narcotics. It was shortly after this purchase
that Hale and his companion were approached by the police. Hale
testified that he fled because he feared another drug conviction.
He claimed that his prior conviction had been the result of being
arrested in the presence of a friend who had narcotics in his
possession. Hale further testified that his estranged wife had
given him about $150 from her welfare check so that he could
purchase some money orders for her, as he had done on several
occasions in the past. The defendant's wife corroborated this part
of his story.
On cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to impeach Hale's credibility by eliciting from him the fact that he had
failed to offer his exculpatory explanation to the police at the
time of his arrest:'
"Q. Did you in any way indicate [to the police] where the
money came from?
"A. No, I didn't.
"Q. Why not?
"A. I didn't feel it was necessary at the time."
Although the trial judge immediately instructed the jury that the
prosecutor's questions were improper, the defendant, on appeal
from his conviction, argued that the instructions had not cured
4. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2135-36 (1975).
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Silence to Impeach Credibility
the prejudicial impact of the evidence .5
In the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,6 the
Government argued that when the defendant took the stand and
testified in his own behalf, he put his credibility in issue, and that
it was proper for the prosecution to seek to impeach his credibility
by confronting him with his prior inconsistent conduct of remaining silent during police interrogation. The theory underlying the
Government's position was that since an innocent man would
have naturally offered an exculpatory explanation to the police
at the first opportunity, the defendant's testimony at trial must
have been a later fabrication.
The court of appeals, relying on Grunewald v. United
States,7 held that the defendant's silence while in police custody
was not inconsistent with his alibi testimony at trial. The defendant's silence lacked probative value on the issue of his credibility and was therefore irrelevant and inadmissible.' The court
found that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
notwithstanding the trial judge's cautionary instructions to the
jury.,
The court of appeals also held that even if the defendant's
in-custody silence was inconsistent with his trial testimony and
was therefore relevant on the issue of his credibility, the fifth
amendment, as interpreted in Miranda, nevertheless forbids the
prosecution from impeaching the credibility of the defendant in
this manner."
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Government relied on
Raffel v. United States." In Raffel, the Supreme Court held that
where a defendant, in reliance on his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, failed to take the stand at his first trial
to refute the testimony of a key prosecution witness, but took the
stand at his second trial to refute the same incriminatory testimony, there was no error in allowing the prosecution to use the
2
fact of the defendant's prior silence to impeach his credibility.
5. Id. at 2136 n.3.
6. United States v. Hale, 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
7. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
8. United States v. Hale, 498 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
9. Id. at 1045.
10. Id. at 1043-44.
11. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
The Government did not argue that if the cross-examination were error, it was
harmless. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2136 n.3 (1975).
12. The Court noted that the trial judge could appropriately instruct the jury that
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The Raffel Court reasoned that when the defendant took the
stand in his own defense at the second trial, he waived completely
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and thus
became subject to cross-examination as any other witness. It was
deemed permissible to cross-examine the defendant about his
silence during his first trial because it might reveal that the reason for his silence was "a lack of faith in the truth or probability
of his own story," which would have a "bearing on his credibility. '13

The Supreme Court in Hale distinguished Raffel. The Court
noted that in Raffel it had found an inconsistency between the
defendant's silence at this first trial and his testimony at his
second. Under the circumstances of Hale, however, there was
simply no inconsistency between the defendant's silence during
police interrogation and his exculpatory explanation at trial.14
In the absence of such an inconsistency, the Court held that the
fact of the defendant's silence lacked probative value on the issue
of his credibility and was therefore irrelevant. The Court also held
that what little probative value the fact of the defendant's silence
may have had on the issue of credibility was outweighed by its
"intolerably prejudicial impact" 15 on the jury. Exercising its supervisory powers over the administration of the federal courts, the
Court affirmed the decision below on this evidentiary basis. 6 The
Court thus avoided deciding whether the fifth amendment would,
under any set of facts, tolerate the use of the fact of the defendant's in-custody silence for impeachment purposes.
The Court held that under the factual circumstance of Hale,
the defendant's silence should not be considered as an admission of the truth of the
incriminatory testimony which he did not deny. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 498
(1926). Thus the Court in Raffel implicitly held that the defendant's silence could not be
considered evidence of guilt. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 420 n.32 (1957).
13. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494,497-98 (1926). See also Grunewald v. United
States, 353 U.S. 391, 420 (1957).
14. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2136-37 (1975).
The Court noted that because it found Raffel inapplicable to the facts of Hale, it was
unnecessary to decide whether Raffel had been overruled sub silentio by the later cases
of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) and Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189
(1943). The Court also cited Justice Black's concurring opinion in Grunewald v. United
States, 353 U.S. 391, 425-26 (1957), in which Justice Black, joined by three other Justices,
expressed the view that Raffel should be explicitly overruled. United States v. Hale, 95
S. Ct. 2133, 2136 n.4 (1975).
For a discussion of Justice Black's concurring opinion in Grunewald and the Johnson
and Griffin cases see notes 25, 30, and 54 infra and accompanying text respectively.
15. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2138 (1975).
16. Id. at 2138-39.
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Silence to Impeach Credibility
the basic premise underlying the Government's contention that
the defendant's silence was inconsistent with his trial testimony-that a person would have offered an exculpatory explanation to the police if he in fact had one-was invalid. A person
under arrest is under no duty to speak, and has been informed
that he has the right to remain silent and that anything he says
can and will be used against him in court. Because police accusations or questions do not naturally call for a reply under such
circumstances, it cannot be said that the arrestee's silence is
inconsistent with a later exculpatory explanation at trial. 17 While
the accusatory statements made by the prosecution witness in
Raffel naturally called for a reply, the accusatory questions of the
police in Hale simply did not.
The Court in Hale noted that under the intimidating atmosphere of arrest and custodial interrogation, the innocent and the
guilty alike, "perhaps particularly the innocent," may choose to
18
stand mute:
A variety of reasons may influence that decision. In these often
emotional and confusing circumstances, a suspect may not have
heard or fully understood the question, or may have felt there
was no need to reply. (Citation omitted.) He may have maintained silence out of fear or unwillingness to incriminate another. Or the arrestee may simply react with silence in response
to the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere surrounding
his detention.
The Court concluded that the outcome of Hale was controlled by its prior decision in Grunewald. In Grunewald, the
defendant verbally invoked his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination when asked certain questions before a grand
jury. When asked the same questions at trial, however, the defendant answered in a manner consistent with his innocence. The
Supreme Court determined that under the factual circumstances
of that case, the defendant's assertion of his fifth amendment
privilege before the grand jury was "wholly consistent" 9 with his
exculpatory explanation at trial. In the absence of an inconsistency between the defendant's silence before the grand jury and
his trial testimony, the Court held that the fact of the defendant's
silence lacked probative value on the issue of credibility. The
17. Id. at 3137.
18. Id.
19. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957).
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Court noted that the use of the defendant's silence in the absence
of a true inconsistency created the danger that the jury would
impermissibly equate the defendant's invocation of the fifth
amendment privilege with guilt, instead of confining its significance to the issue of credibility." Exercising its supervisory
powers over the administration of the federal criminal justice
system, the Grunewald Court held that the prosecutor's crossexamination of the defendant with respect to his fifth amendment plea before the grand jury was prejudicial error and therefore granted a new trial.
The Court in Grunewald did not hold that the explicit invocation of one's fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination could never be considered inconsistent with a later
exculpatory explanation at trial. In Hale, the Court similarly
premised its holding on the specific facts of the case. After Hale,
however, it is difficult to imagine factual circumstances under
which the Court would find a defendant's custodial silence or
invocation of his fifth amendment privilege inconsistent with a
later assertion of innocence at trial. This is because the reasons
cited by the Court as to why an innocent man would decline to
talk to the police are applicable to most, if not all, arrestees.
As previously stated, the Court held that Grunewald controlled the outcome of Hale. The Court noted that in Grunewald,
three factors were considered important in determining whether
silence was inconsistent with a later assertion of innocence at
trial: 2'
(1) repeated assertions of innocence before the grand jury; (2)
the secretive nature of the tribunal in which the initial
questioning occurred; and (3) the focus on petitioner as potential defendant at the time of arrest, making it "natural for him
to fear that he was being asked questions for the very purpose
of providing evidence against himself." (Citation and footnote
omitted.)
The Court said that applying the above factors, Hale presented an even stronger case than Grunewald for excluding the
evidence of the defendant's silence. First, except for the period
during police interrogation when he was silent, Hale repeatedly
asserted his innocence. Second, the silence at issue in Hale was
20. Id. at 424.
21. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2137-38 (1975).
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Silence to Impeach Credibility
in "response" to questions asked in a setting far more secretive
than in Grunewald, where grand jurors and a court stenographer
were present. The Court reasoned that this factor is significant
because an innocent person might prefer to make statements in
the presence of an attorney or in open court. 22 Finally, the Court
noted that Hale was more clearly a potential defendant than the
Hale had been the subject of an
defendant in Grunewald because
2
1
eye-witness identification.
The first factor will be present in every case. When a defendant goes to trial and takes the stand in his own defense, he
presumably has pleaded not guilty and will consistently assert his
innocence on the stand. The second factor will also be present in
every case. Police interrogation does not take place in open court.
If the defendant remains silent with an attorney present, it is
probably in reliance upon the advice of counsel. Such reliance is
logically irrelevant to the issue of credibility. The third factor will
also be present in every case. A person is not lawfully arrested
unless there is probable cause to believe that he is guilty of
22. The Court in Hale quoted with approval the following dicta from Grunewald:
Innocent men are more likely to [remain silent] in secret proceedings
where they testify without advice of counsel and without opportunity for crossexamination, than in open court proceedings where cross-examination and judicially supervised procedure provide safeguards for the establishing of the whole,
as against the possibility of merely partial truth. Grunewald v. United States,
[353 U.S. 391, 422-23 (1957)].
United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 n.6 (1975).
Chief Justice Burger in a concurring opinion in Hale expressed the view that although
the Court was correct in not deciding Hale on constitutional grounds, a "dubious aspect
of the Court's opinion" was to renew the above-quoted dicta of Grunewald. Id. at 2139.
The Chief Justice labeled as a "fallacy" the notion that innocent men are more likely to
remain silent in secret proceedings than in open court proceedings. He remarked that:
[Tlhere is not a scintilla of empirical data to support the first generalization
nor is it something generally accepted as validated by ordinary human experience. It is no more accurate than to say. . .that the innocent are the first to
protest their innocence than that the guilty do so. There is simply no basis for
declaring a generalized probability one way or the other.
Id.
The Chief Justice also expressed the view that the notion that people are more likely
to speak out in open court proceedings had "no basis in human experience," id., thus
implicitly suggesting that the Court's holding in Raffel should be overruled. See note 14
supra and accompanying text. He noted that:
A confident, assured person will likely speak out in either place; a timid, insecure person may be more overwhelmed by the formality of "open court proceedings" than by a police station. Moreover, in "open court" if one is an accused,
there is a constitutional option to remain totally silent but if an accused takes
the stand he must answer all admissible questions.
Id. at 2139.
23. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2138 (1975).
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committing a crime. The arrestee certainly will always believe he
has been accused of committing a crime.
Under the holding in Hale, it appears that the greater the
evidence of guilt against a particular arrestee, the less likely it
will be that the Court will find his silence inconsistent with a later
assertion of innocence. In Hale, the Government argued that an
innocent person would be motivated to offer the police an easily
verifiable exculpatory explanation in the hope of obtaining an
early release from police custody. The Supreme Court, however,
noted that because of the strong evidence against him, Hale had
no reason to think that an exculpatory explanation would have
hastened his release. Moreover, Hale's "prior contacts with the
police and his participation in a narcotics rehabilitation program
further diminished the likelihood of his release, irrespective of
2' 4
what he might say.
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, expressed the view
that Hale was controlled by Miranda, and quoted with approval
a portion of Justice Black's concurring opinion in Grunewald:25
24. Id.
It is arguable that in at least one reported case, People v. Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355,
320 N.E.2d 639, 361 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1974), the defendant's silence could be deemed inconsistent with his later exculpatory explanation at trial even under the strict standards of
Hale. In Rothschild, the defendant was a police officer accused of grand larceny and
attempted grand larceny, both by extortion. The police had arrested the defendant in the
act of accepting money from the complaining witness, who had told the police a few days
earlier that the defendant had already extorted $6,000 from him by threatening to send
his daughter-in-law to jail. At trial, the defendant testified that the complaining witness
had offered to bribe him, and that he (the defendant) had agreed to accept the money so
he could later arrest the complaining witness. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked
the defendant whether he had informed his superior officers, or anyone else, about the
bribe offer either before or after his arrest. The defendant answered in the negative. The
New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant's silence was "patently inconsistent
with the defense asserted" and that the cross-examination was proper since, in the court's
opinion, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) had modified Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) in the impeachment context. People v. Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355, 36061, 320 N.E.2d 639, 641-42, 361 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904-05 (1974). For a discussion of Harris,
see text accompanying notes 61-64 infra.
25. United States v. Hale, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 2139 (1975), quoting Grunewald v. United
States, 353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957). Justice Black in Grunewald, continued:
The value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be
penalized for relying on them. It seems peculiarly incongruous and indefensible
for courts which exist and act only under the Constitution to draw inferences of
lack of honesty from invocation of a privilege deemed worthy of enshrinement
in the Constitution.
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425-26 (1957). See also note 14 supra and
accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss1/5

8

Freeswick: United States v. Hale

Silence to Impeach Credibility
I do not, like the Court, rest my conclusion on the special circumstances of this case. I can think of no special circumstances
that would justify use of a constitutional privilege to discredit
or convict a person who asserts it.
In Justice Douglas' opinion, the fifth amendment prohibits the
prosecution from cross-examining a defendant about his silence
during police interrogation even where such silence has probative
value on the issue of credibility.
In his concurring opinion, Justice White expressed the view
that in light of Miranda, which requires that an arrestee be
warned that he has a right to remain silent and that anything he
says can and will be used against him:26
[I]t does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his [the defendant's]
silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not
speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he
need not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the
truth of his trial testimony.
Justice White pointed out that Hale had not been informed
"that silence, as well as his words could be used against him at
trial," and in addition noted that "indeed, anyone would reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be the
case. ' 27 Justice Douglas indicated that he too would have affirmed on this due process ground.2
Justice White cited Johnson v. United States29 in support of
his due process argument. In Johnson, the defendant took the
stand in his own defense, and was informed by the judge (albeit
mistakenly) that he had a fifth amendment right to refuse to
answer certain questions. The defendant invoked the privilege,
and the court granted it. In summation, the prosecutor commented on the defendant's silence for the purpose of impeaching
his credibility. The Supreme Court held that as a result, the
defendant was denied a fair trial since fundamental fairness requires that a defendant not be misled about his fifth amendment

privilege :30
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2139 (1975).
Id.
Id.
318 U.S. 189 (1943).
Id. at 197. See also note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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An accused having the assurance of the court that his claim of
privilege would be granted might well be entrapped if his assertion of the privilege could then be used against him. His real
choice might then be quite different from his apparent one ...
Elementary fairness requires that an accused should not be
misled on that score. . . . If he receives assurance that it will
be granted if claimed, or if it is claimed and granted outright,
he has every right to expect that the ruling is made in good faith
and that the rule against comment will be observed.
The Impact of Hale
The fact that Hale was a federal case and was not decided
on constitutional grounds means, of course, that the holding of
the case will have no binding effect on the states. It is possible,
however, that in reviewing a future state case, the Supreme Court
will hold that the defendant's silence was so lacking in probative
value on the issue of his credibility and was so highly prejudicial
that the defendant was denied due process of law as guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. With respect to federal
evidentiary law, those federal courts which heretofore have held
that the fact of a defendant's silence in the face of police accusation is relevant on the issue of credibility will have to strain in
order to distinguish Hale.
Hale, however, will not change existing constitutionallaw as
set forth by the various federal courts of appeal. 1 For example,
the alternative holding of the court of appeals in Hale-that evidence of the defendant's silence during police interrogation is
inadmissible on fifth amendment grounds-will remain good law
in the District of Columbia Circuit. Such a constitutionally based
rule is desirable, for if the law were otherwise, the courts would
be faced with deciding on a case-by-case basis the evidentiary
question of whether a defendant's in-custody silence is sufficiently inconsistent with his trial testimony to be relevant on the
issue of credibility, and whether its probative value outweighs its
31. Five circuit courts of appeal have held that the fifth amendment prohibits the
use of defendant's silence while in police custody for impeachment purposes. See United
States v. Hale, 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d
Cir. 1970); United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United States,
410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969).
Two circuits, however, have held the opposite. See United States ex rel. Burt v. New
Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973) (the concurring opinion
of Rosen, C.J., is the majority opinion); United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Sharpe v. United States, 410 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1969).
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prejudicial impact on the jury. Normally, such evidentiary matters are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. However,
as the Court suggested in Hale, the exercise of such discretion will
be subject to careful review on appeal since this evidentiary issue
has "grave constitutional overtones." 3 This case-by-case approach would be reminiscent of the pre-Miranda due process
cases in which the courts had to determine whether, given the
totality of the circumstances in each case, the statements made
by a defendant while under police interrogation were voluntary.
Appellate courts were flooded with confession cases-even the
Supreme Court could not avoid taking a few each year. Miranda's
four-fold warnings and waiver doctrine, however, changed this
because a warning and a waiver are clear-cut facts which can be
conclusively decided by the trial court. Similarly, the
constitutional holding of the court of appeals in Hale has the
values of simplicity and certainty.
Of greater significance, the constitutional holding of the
court of appeals in Hale is the only rule consistent with due
process. If the rule were otherwise, an arrestee would be deprived
of the ability to make an intelligent decision of whether he should
exercise his right to take the stand in his own defense in that it
would be impossible to predict whether the courts would find his
silence during police interrogation inconsistent with his trial testimony. Would the defendant be able to obtain an advance ruling
on this issue by testifying before the judge in camera, or, at least,
out of the presence of the jury?33 Would the defendant be fully
informed of the consequences of remaining silent at the time of
arrest so that the choice of whether to exercise or waive his right
to remain silent could be intelligently made? Miranda clearly
requires this much. Would a fifth warning be added to the traditional four-fold Mirandawarnings: "You have a right to remain
silent and anything you say can and will be used against you. But
if you remain silent, and if you take the stand in your own defense
at trial and assert your innocence, the prosecution may be able
to use the fact of your silence at this time to challenge your
credibility"?31
32. United State v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2138 n.7 (1975).
33. In People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974),
the New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to a pre-trial hearing
on the question of whether a prior conviction is sufficiently probative on the issue of his
credibility to be used by the prosecution for impeachment purposes. See 3 HOFSTRA L. REV.
168 (1975).
34. See note 30 supra, note 50 infra and accompanying text.
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An examination of the holding of the Supreme Court in
Miranda will demonstrate that the constitutional holding of the
court of appeals in Hale is the only rule consistent with the fifth
amendment right to remain silent. Even where the fact of silence
during police interrogation does have probative value on the issue
of credibility, a defendant's fifth amendment right to remain silent nevertheless outweighs the prosecution's right to crossexamine the defendant "as any other witness." 5
Miranda v. Arizona and the Fifth Amendment Right to Remain
Silent
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution
may not use at trial the statements of a defendant, made during
custodial police interrogation, unless the police had first informed
him of his fifth amendment rights and he had waived those
rights." The four-fold Miranda warnings are that the defendant
has a right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will
be used against him, that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney and that if he is indigent an attorney will be appointed
for him. In the judgment of the Supreme Court, the right to the
presence of an attorney and the four-fold warnings were needed
to ensure that any statement of the defendant
was a product of
3
his free choice rather than police compulsion. 1
The Court termed the first warning-that the accused has a
right to remain silent-"an absolute prerequisite in overcoming
the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. ' 39 It was
35. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1926). Such a rule would require
the overruling of Raffel. For a discussion of this case see text accompanying note 13 supra
and note 72 infra.
36. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
The Court held that if a statement is taken, the prosecution has a "heavy burden"
to demonstrate that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his
right to remain silent and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Id. at 475.
37. Id. at 469-73.
The Court held that the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed, was necessary to protect the defendant's fifth amendment right to remain
silent rather than to effectuate his sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 469.
38. Id. at 457-58. Chief Justice Warren stated that:
The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our
Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled
to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.
39. Id. at 468.
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noted that one common police technique used to compel a defendant to incriminate himself was to either expressly or impliedly
suggest that "silence in the face of accusation is itself damning
and will bode ill when presented to a jury."4
For centuries prior to Miranda, it had been the law of both
England and America that the admissibility of inculpatory statements made by the defendant while in police custody depended
upon whether the statements were made "freely, voluntarily, and
without compulsion or inducement of any sort. ' 41 A confession
failed to satisfy this standard if it had been "influenced by any
threat or promise. ' 42 In Bram v. United States,4 3 the Supreme
Court held that where, during the course of police interrogation,
an accused is made to fear that the failure to assert his innocence

would be considered an admission of guilt, any subsequent state-

ment made by him is involuntary and inadmissible at trial. 4
The first Mirandawarning, then, was needed to negative the
inherent threat of in-custody police interrogation: silence "will
bode ill when presented to a jury., 45 If a defendant is made aware

of his right to remain silent, he will naturally assume that the
prosecution can not use that silence against him at trial.4 6 Thus

assured, he is free to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
decision whether to exercise or waive his fifth amendment privi40. Id. The Court cited various police manuals and texts used by law enforcement
agencies as guides to effective in-custody interrogation. The texts describe various psychological techniques designed to coerce an accused into making inculpatory statements.
Id. at 448-55 & nn.8-24. The Court noted, however, that even in the absence of the physical
brutality of the "third degree" or the psychological pressures of these police interrogation
techniques, in-custody police interrogation was nevertheless inherently coercive. Id. at
455.
41. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896).
For a history of the English common law rule that the inculpatory statements of a
defendant made during police interrogation are inadmissible at trial if they were made
involuntarily, see Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
42. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897).
43. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
44. Id. at 562.
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
In Miranda'sfootnote 37 the Court quoted from P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

32 (1958):
It is probable that even today, when there is much less ignorance about these
matters than formerly, there is still a general belief that you must answer all
questions put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will be the worse for you
if you do not.
46. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2139 (1975) (White, J., concurring); Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-99 (1943).
IN ENGLAND
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lege. It was within this context that the Miranda Court inserted
footnote 37:11
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to
penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood
mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
(Citations omitted.)
Although at least one authority has referred to footnote 37 as
"clearly dictum," 8 it nevertheless appears that the rule laid down
in footnote 37 was a necessary corollary to the basic holding of
Miranda, and therefore can be considered part of the holding of
that case rather than mere dictum. Simply stated, there could
not have been a Mirandaholding without footnote 37 because the
right to remain silent and the right on the part of the prosecution
to use that silence against the accused at trial for any purpose are
mutually exclusive.
While Miranda is important since it was the first modem
Supreme Court case clearly holding that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to the police interrogation room,49 the major significance of the case lies in the
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
48. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 161, at 354 n.3 (2d ed. 1972). McCormick's view was
based upon the fact that neither Miranda nor the defendants in the three cases consolidated with Miranda for decision (Vignera v. New York; Westover v. United States; and
California v. Stewart) had remained silent during their police interrogations.
McCormick, however, also asserts that Miranda'sfootnote 37 "leaves little doubt that
silence or a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination made in response to a police
accusation during custodial interrogation is inadmissible, and the decisions following
Miranda have so interpreted it." Id.
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966).
The privilege against self-incrimination is centuries old, dating back to the Bible and
the Torah. Id. at 458-59 & n.27. The right to remain silent in the face of police interrogation has been "common knowledge" for decades. See McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d
298, 299 (6th Cir. 1928). Today "virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concept."
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.).
The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966), noted that the
question of whether the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to
in-custody police interrogation "could have been taken as settled in federal courts almost
70 years ago," by its decision in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897), where
the Court held:
In criminal trials in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself,"
See also text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
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constitutional requirements which the Court held necessary to
protect the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination-the four-fold warnings and the right to counsel. It
is inconceivable that the MirandaCourt would have held that the
fifth amendment privilege must be safeguarded by the administration of warnings if it had contemplated that the exercise of this
privilege might form the basis of an adverse inference at trial. If
that were the case, due process would require a fifth warning: "If
you do remain silent, that too will be used against you."5 Such a
warning, however, would constitute a court-mandated threat,
which would render any subsequent statements by the accused
involuntary and hence inadmissible." The Miranda Court, howThe Supreme Court in Bram held that the fifth amendment "was but a crystalization
of the doctrine as to confessions, well settled when the amendment was adopted." Bram
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). Brain was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924) which held that the voluntariness standard
for confessions was derived from the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 462 (1966).
The fifth amendment, however, was not made applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Prior to Miranda,however, the fifth amendment's "voluntariness" standard for in-custody
statements of the defendant was applied to the states in the guise of "due process." Id.
at 6-8. See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974).
Miranda, however, changed the focus from whether the defendant's statements were
voluntary to whether he had knowingly and intelligently waived his fifth amendment right
to remain silent. Id. at 441-44. Of course, even after Miranda, the defendant's statements
must be voluntary to be admissible in evidence for any purpose. See Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971). The four-fold Mirandawarnings, the right to counsel, and the waiver
doctrine were intended as added protective devices to safeguard the right to remain silent.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457
(1966).
50. See United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2139-40 (1975) (White, J., concurring);
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
Almost 40 years prior to Miranda the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928), held that the right to remain
silent precluded the prosecution from offering into evidence the fact of defendant's incustody silence as evidence of guilt or for the purpose of impeaching his credibility. The
McCarthy court noted that:
[To draw a derogatory inference from mere silence is to compel the respondent
to testify; and the customary formula of warning should be changed, and the
respondent should be told, "If you say anything, it will be used against you; if
you do not say anything, that will be used against you."
Id.
The court in McCarthy was not suggesting that a fifth warning, if given, would cure
the constitutional objection to the use of the defendant's silence against him at trial. To
the contrary, the court was highlighting the fact that the fifth amendment right to remain
silent would be destroyed if the fact of silence could later be used against the defendant
for any purpose.
See also McCORMICK, supra note 48, § 161, at 354 n.4.
51. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
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ever, avoided holding that confessions could never be used
against an accused. Yet this would be the result if the fifth warning were administered. If the fifth warning were given, and the
subsequent statements of an accused were nevertheless held admissible, then the fifth warning has undermined the very constitutional privilege which the first four warnings were intended to
protect. Therefore, the administration of a fifth warning would
result in either the inadmissibility of statements made during
police interrogation, or, if the statements were held admissible,
in the destruction of the fifth amendment right to be free from
"threats" which compel an accused to incriminate himself.
Furthermore, the administration of a fifth warning would not
cure the constitutional objection to the use of a defendant's incustody silence against him at trial. If an arrestee chooses to
exercise his right to remain silent, later use of that silence by the
prosecution would amount to a court-imposed penalty for not
talking to the police, and would thus destroy the privilege by
making its exercise costly.52 As indicated in Miranda's footnote

37, it is well established that it is unconstitutional to impose a
"penalty" on the exercise of one's fifth amendment privilege. For
example, in Griffin v. California"the Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's failure to take the
stand, nor may the court instruct the jury that such conduct may
be used as evidence of guilt. The Court concluded that either
circumstance would amount to a court-imposed "penalty" for the
defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination.54
For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the
"inquisitorial system of criminal justice," Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 [(1964)] which the Fifth Amend52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). See also Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
53. 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
54. Id. at 614.
See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) where a five-Justice majority had
held the same as in Griffin. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 n.5 (1965).
Naturally, it is impermissible for a state to resort to imprisonment to compel a person
to answer questions that might incriminate him. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
The Malloy Court noted that:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right
of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise
of his own will, and to suffer no penalty. . . for such silence (emphasis added).
Id. See also note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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ment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making
its assertion costly.

One circuit court of appeals5 5 has held that regardless of
Miranda'sinterpretation of the fifth amendment, the use of the
defendant's silence as an "adoptive admission"56 evidencing guilt
55. United States ex rel. Smith v. Brierly, 267 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 384
F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Staino v. Brierly, 269 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 387 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1967).
56. The rule of "adoptive admissions" is based on the general notion that "qui tacet
consentire videtur," or "silence gives consent." 4 J. WmMORE,EVIDENCE § 1071 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 222, at 197 (10th ed. 1973) states the rule
as follows:
When a party fails to deny a statement made in his presence, under such circumstances that the party heard and fully understood what was said, and had
an opportunity to reply, and would naturally have denied the statement had he
regarded it as untrue, then the statement, together with the fact of his silence,
is admissible in evidence on the theory that the party's silence, was under the
circumstances, a tacit admission of the truth of the statement.
If one accepts the basic premise that a person in police custody accused of a crime
would naturally be inclined to deny the truth of incriminatory police accusations (as many
courts have) then, under the rule of "adoptive admissions," if the arrestee remains silent,
both the police accusations and the fact of silence are admissible on the state's case-inchief as evidence of guilt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889
(1943). The incriminatory statements need not be made by the police. Any incriminatory
statement made in the presence of the accused, such as a statement by a co-defendant, is
sufficient to invoke the rule of adoptive admissions. Should the defendant decide to take
the stand in his own defense, the police accusations and the fact of the defendant's silence
can be admitted on the state's rebuttal case for the purpose of impeaching the credibility
of the defendant. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 56, at § 1040(3).
Moreover, the defendant's silence can be used against him even in the absence of
incriminatory statements made by others. The rule is that "[a] failure to assert a fact,
when it would have been natural to assert it, amounts in effect to an assertion of the nonexistence of the fact." Id. § 1042, at 1056. Thus, if the arrestee fails to assert his innocence,
or fails to offer an exculpatory explanation, under the logic of the above rule he has in
effect admitted that he is guilty or that he does not have an exculpatory explanation.
Thus, a "tacit admission" may, as a matter of evidentiary law, be offered on the state's
direct case as evidence of guilt or on cross-examination for impeachment purposes.
Both of these rules bear no rational relation to the realities of human psychology in
the context of police interrogation, and are legal fictions imposed by judges as a penalty
for not talking to the police. The basic infirmity of the adoptive admission and tacit
admission rules is their false premise that an innocent person in police custody would
naturally be inclined to deny the truth of incriminatory accusations or offer an exculpatory
explanation. United States v. Hale, 95 S.Ct. 2133. (1975).
The adoptive admission rule is severely criticized in Commonwealth ex rel. Staino v.
Cavell, 207 Pa. Super. 274, 217 A.2d 824 (1966) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); and Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943) (Maxey, C. J., dissenting).
Even prior to Miranda, some jurisdictions had rejected the logical validity of these
evidentiary rules, holding that silence in the face of incriminatory statements while in
police custody could not be used as evidence of guilt on the state's case-in-chief. See cases
collected on both sides in 4 WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 1072(4), at 118 n.. For example,
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violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
since the admission is involuntary per se. Under the pre-Miranda
due process cases, a statement made by an accused while in police custody was inadmissible as evidence of guilt or for impeachment purposes if the statement was involuntary, i.e., not the
product of a defendant's free choice. Under due process (now fifth
amendment) standards, a suspect in police custody must be allowed a "free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer"
police accusations.-" If the legal fiction of the adoptive admission
rule is applied, a refusal to answer is transformed into an admission, thus vitiating a defendant's free choice to refuse to answer,
and rendering the "admission" involuntary and inadmissible."
Today there is no doubt that the fifth amendment forbids the
prosecution from using the fact of defendant's silence during
police interrogation as evidence of guilt.59 The question left
unresolved by Hale is whether a defendant's silence during
police interrogation may constitutionally be used to impeach his
credibility where it is legally probative of that issue.6"
in People v. Rutigliano, 26 N.Y. 103, 107, 184 N.E. 689, 690 (1933), the New York Court
of Appeals, following Commonwealth v. McDermott, 123 Mass. 440, 25 Am. R. 120 (1877),
reasoned that:
No cautious person, when in custody, accused of crime would care to enter into
a discussion of his guilt or innocence with his captors and codefendants, when
what he said might be used against him. It cannot be said that "the declaration
was [in such circumstances] in substance a challenge to [him] to assert [his]
innocence if [he] were not guilty. Kelley v. People, [55 N.Y. 565, 573, 14 Am.
R. 342, 348 (1874)]." He is then under no duty to speak and his silence should
not be counted as giving assent to what he hears.
In addition to the fact that the adoptive admission rule has no basis in logic, the rule
is also subject to much police abuse. See United States ex rel. Staino v. Brierly, 387 F.2d
597 (3d Cir. 1967) (police abuse of the tacit admission rule amounted to a denial of due
process of law).
The courts which eventually overruled their prior law and held that a defendant's
silence during police interrogation could no longer be used as evidence of guilt on the
state's case-in-chief, did so not because they no longer considered the tacit admission rule
logically valid, but because Miranda'sfootnote 37 rendered the rule unconstitutional. See
Commonwealth ex rel. Shadd v. Myers, 423 Pa. 82, 223 A.2d 296 (1966); State v. Rice, 37
Wis. 2d 392, 155 N.W.2d 116 (1967). See also 3 WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 821, at 309 n.3
and the cases cited therein.
57. United States ex rel. Smith v. Brierly, 267 F. Supp. 274, 281-82 (E.D. Pa.), afl'd,
384 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1967).
58. Id. See also note 49 supra.
59. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957); Gillison
v. United States, 399 F.2d 586, 587-88 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. McKinney, 379
F.2d 259, 261-62 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173, 174-75 (2d Cir.
1966); Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673, 677 (1st Cir. 1965).
60, See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 56, § 821, at 318 n.9 ("Police Station Silence To
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The leading cases which hold that the fifth amendment does
the use of a defendant's silence during police interroprohibit
not
gation for impeachment purposes are based on Harris v. New
York,"1 where the Supreme Court limited Mirandaby refusing to
apply its exclusionary rule in the context of impeachment. In
Harris, the Court held that where the police fail to give the
Mira da warnings, statements made by the accused, although
inadmissible as evidence of guilt, are admissible for impeachment
purposes "provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.""2 The HarrisCourt stated:"3
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. We hold,
therefore, that petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements. (Emphasis
added.)
Reliance on Harrisfor the proposition that the prosecution may
constitutionally cross-examine a defendant about his silence during police interrogation for impeachment purposes is misplaced.
In Harris, the defendant did not exercise his fifth amendment
right to remain silent. He talked. The inconsistency between his
pre-trial utterances and his testimony was highly probative on
the issue of his credibility. Furthermore, by failing to give the
defendant his Miranda warnings, the police in Harris did not
violate the defendant's basic fifth amendment right to remain
silent. As the Supreme Court held in Michigan v. Tucker,64 the
Impeach"); 3A id., § 1042, at 1056 n.1.

The leading state court cases which hold that the fifth amendment prohibits the
prosecution from using the defendant's silence during police interrogation to impeach his
credibility-even where it can be said that the defendant's silence has probative value on
that issue-are State v. Galasso, 217 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1968) (In this case the Miranda
warnings were not given. Logically, the result should be the same where the Miranda
warnings are given.) and Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968)
(The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously held in Commonwealth ex rel. Shadd
v. Myers, 423 Pa. 82, 223 A.2d 296 (1966) that the defendant's silence could not be used
as evidence of guilt in the state's case-in-chief.)
The leading state court lcases which reach a conclusion contrary to that of Williams
and Galasso are State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968) and People v.
Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355, 320 N.E.2d 639, 361 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1974). For a discussion of
the Rothschild case, see note 23 supra.
The leading federal cases on both sides of this issue are cited in note 31 supra.
61. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
62. Id. at 224.
63. Id. at 226.
64. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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Miranda warnings are merely devices which serve to protect the
basic fifth amendment right to remain silent.
The scales of justice in Harriswere weighted differently than
they would be in a case where the prosecution sought to use the
defendant's silence to impeach his credibility and where, unlike
Hale, that silence has probative value. In Harris, the need for
Miranda's prophylactic warnings was weighed against allowing
the prosecution to use the voluntary, non-coerced utterances of
an accused which were highly probative on the issue of his credibility. In the posited case, on the other hand, the basic fifth
amendment right itself-the right to remain silent-must be
weighed against the marginal benefit to be derived from the introduction of the fact of silence. As Hale demonstrates, silence can
never have more than a legal minimum of probative value and
will always present the danger of prejudice. In the posited case,
the scales of justice clearly tip in favor of the fifth amendment
privilege, and the fact of silence should be excluded.
It is clear that the voluntary, non-coerced utterances of an
arrestee can be used against him. But if his silence can also be
used against him, an arrestee has been given a Hobson's
choice-he can waive his right to remain silent and risk having
his own words used against him, or he can invoke his constitutional right and risk having his silence used to impeach his credibility.65
The issue is beclouded by the fact that we are talking about
silence and what it means. The argument is that if an arrestee
fails to offer the police an exclupatory explanation, he has tacitly
admitted that he does not have one.6 6 This is merely another way
of saying that if an arrestee fails to assert his innocence to the
In Tucker the police failed to inform the defendant that he had a right to appointed
counsel if he was indigent, as required by Miranda.The police subsequently learned from
the defendant the identity of a person who later testified against the defendant at trial.
The defendant, relying on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), claimed that
the witness' testimony should have been excluded because it was the fruit of a violation
of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as interpreted in Miranda.
The Court held that Wong Sun was inapplicable because in that case the police
actually violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights, while in Tucker,
[t]he police conduct. . . did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic
standards later laid down by this Court in Mirandato safeguard that privilege.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
65. See United States ex reL. Smith v. Brierly, 384 F.2d 992, 993-94 (3d Cir. 1967).
66. For a discussion of the "adoptive admissions" and "tacit admissions" rules, see
note 56 supra.
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police, he must be guilty. Assuming arguendothat such a rule has
logical validity, it is, nevertheless, at odds with the fundamental
precepts underlying the fifth amendment-ours is an accusatory,
not an inquisitorial system of justice,17 and innocent people
should be protected against being compelled to incriminate
themselves out of their own mouths. If the arrestee, instead of
remaining silent, told the police, "I hereby invoke my right to
remain silent; I refuse to comment on your accusations, and I
refuse to answer your questions," could there be any doubt that
that statement could not be used to impeach the defendant's
credibility if he took the stand in his own defense?" If that statement may not be used, neither may silence. It would be unjust
and unreasonable to condition one's fifth amendment privilege on
a formal verbal invocation when, by the very act of remaining
silent, one has already invoked and is exercising it. Whether the
privilege is invoked consciously or unconsciously should be totally
irrelevant in light of the fact that it is impossible to determine
whether silence is a conscious exercise of one's privilege. Silence
is, then, an exercise of one's fifth amendment right to refuse
comment from which no derogatory inference may constitutionally be drawn."
If the rule were otherwise, the fifth amendment right to silence would be destroyed. If it became common knowledge that
the prosecution could use silence for impeachment purposes, even
an innocent suspect might feel compelled to speak to the police
to avoid attacks upon his credibility. 0 Under the inherent pressures of in-custody police interrogation, even innocent people
could make statements which could later be construed in an incriminatory fashion. Thus, the courts would be compelling the
67. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
68. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425-26 (1957) (Black, J., concurring); Sharp v. United States, 410 F.2d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, C.J., dissenting);
Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673, 677 (1st Cir. 1965).
69. Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1068 (10th Cir. 1973).
70. As the law presently exists, however, one cannot assume that an innocent man
would naturally feel compelled to speak to the police while in custody. This is because,
inter alia, if the Miranda warnings have been given, the accused is acutely aware that he
has a right to remain silent and that anything he says can and will be used against him.
These warnings implicitly carry with them the assurance that if he does remain silent,
that fact cannot later be used against him. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2139-40
(1975) (White, J., concurring.) Thus, an innocent man under the present law can remain
silent knowing that he has not incriminated himself in any way, and knowing also that if
he does say something, it could later be used against him. See Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971) and People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, 184 N.E. 689 (1933).
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innocent to incriminate themselves out of their own mouths-the
very evil which the fifth amendment was designed to prevent.7'
Conclusion
In Hale, the Supreme Court held that under the factual circumstances of that case, the fact of the defendant's silence during
police interrogation lacked sufficient probative value on the issue
of credibility to be admissible, thus leaving open the possibility
that different facts might produce a different result. When the
Court is faced with such a case, it will be forced to decide the
constitutional issue avoided in Hale: Does the fifth amendment
prohibit the prosecution from using the fact of the defendant's
silence during police interrogation for impeachment purposes
even where it can be said that the defendant's silence has probative value on the issue of his credibility? At that point the Supreme Court will be unable to avoid choosing between the irreconcilable cases of Miranda and Raffel. In Raffel the Supreme
Court held that when a defendant takes the stand in his own
defense, he completely waives his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and may be cross-examined for the
purpose of impeaching his credibility "as any other witness." As
72
the Court stated in Raffel:

His failure to deny or explain evidence of incriminating
circumstances of which he may have knowledge, may be the
basis of [an] adverse inference and the jury may be so instructed. (Footnote omitted.) His waiver is not partial; having
once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at
will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing.
If, therefore, the questions asked of the defendant were logically relevant, and competent within the scope of the rules of
cross-examination, they were proper questions, unless there is
some reason of policy in the law of evidence which requires their
exclusion.
The Raffel Court concluded that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was not a sufficient "reason of policy"
to exclude from evidence the fact of the defendant's silence in the
face of incriminatory accusations at his first trial.
Forty years later, after the continued vitality of Raffel had
71. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957).
72. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497 (1926).
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already been placed in doubt by the cases of Johnson v. United
7 4 the Miranda Court appeared
States73 and Griffin v. California,
to hold that the fact that the defendant stood mute, or claimed
his privilege in the face of police accusation, could not be used
against him at trial for any purpose. The Court, however, did not
explicitly overrule Raffel, as four Justices in a concurring opinion
75
in Grunewald v. United States had urged nine years earlier.
As Miranda conclusively demonstrates, the time for explicitly overruling Raffel is long overdue; it is impossible for a person
to effectively exercise his privilege against self-incrimination in
the police interrogation room if the fact of silence could later be
used against him in the courtroom. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the right to take the stand in
one's own defense are too central to our system of criminal justice
to be traded, one against the other. Moreover, due process would
seem to require that the defendant should at least have the right
to make an intelligent decision whether to trade off his rights. As
Justice White correctly pointed out in his concurring opinion in
Hale, anyone would reasonably conclude from the Mirandawarnings that if he remained silent, that fact could not be used against
him at trial. If the reality were otherwise, an arrestee would be
denied the opportunity to intelligently decide whether to exercise
or waive his fifth amendment right to remain silent. A fifth warning, however, would amount to a court-mandated threat which
would render any subsequent statement made by the accused
involuntary and inadmissible. Thus, requiring a fifth warning
would effectively amount to a ruling that confessions are no
longer admissible in evidence. Although a meritorious argument
could be made in favor of such a policy, the Supreme Court
avoided that conclusion in Miranda.
In Harris,76 the Supreme Court held that where the police
fail to give the Mirandawarnings, the statements of the defendant are nevertheless admissible for impeachment purposes. In
Oregon v. Haas,7 the Supreme Court held that where the police,
73. 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
74. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
75. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 426 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in
an opinion joined by Warren, C.J., Douglas & Brennan, JJ.).
76. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
77. 95 S. Ct. 1215 (1975).
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that:
If, however, he [the arresteel indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be
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in violation of Miranda,obtain incriminatory statements from an
arrestee after he has requested an attorney, those statements
may also be used for impeachment purposes. Harrisprovides the
police with an incentive not to give the Miranda warnings. Haas
provides an incentive to press the accused for incriminatory
statements even after he has indicated that he wants to exercise
his right to counsel or his right to silence. If the silence of the
accused may also be used against him, then the police, by the
mere act of arresting a person on suspicion of committing a crime,
have placed the arrestee in the position of choosing between the
Scylla of talking and the Charybdis of remaining silent. If the
arrestee talks, anything he says can be used against him. If he
remains silent, he can never know for sure whether a court will
later find that his silence is inconsistent with his exculpatory
explanation. Perhaps a pre-trial hearing could be held on this
issue; but such a hearing would not help the defendant make an
intelligent decision whether to speak or remain silent at the time
of arrest. Thus, if it became common knowledge that silence
could be used for impeachment purposes, the innocent might
feel compelled to talk to the police in order to preserve their
right to tell their story to the jury. Under the pressure of incustody police interrogation, even innocent people can make
statements which could later be construed in an incriminatory
fashion.
In sum, justice requires that the prosecution be prohibited
from using the fact of the accused's silence for impeachment purposes. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and the right on the part of the accused to take the stand in his
own defense are two "reason[s] of policy" which compel this rule
of constitutional law.
James R. Freeswick

no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner

that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
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